A recent appellate court decision has upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by a former police officer who challenged his termination from employment, raising important questions about how administrative appeals and related legal claims are handled in Ohio courts. The ruling clarifies that certain statutory appeals cannot be voluntarily dismissed and refiled under Ohio’s savings statute, affecting how public employees may seek recourse after being let go.
Daniel Yarnell, who previously served as a police officer for the Village of Smithville, filed an appeal in Wayne County Court of Common Pleas after his employment was terminated by the village council on May 17, 2022. The stated reason for his dismissal was “dishonesty,” specifically relating to his response on a personal history questionnaire regarding prior dismissals or resignations from other positions. According to court documents, Smithville learned that Yarnell’s probationary employment with the City of Canal Fulton had ended due to issues with tardiness and discrepancies on his time sheet, contrary to what he reported.
Following his termination, Yarnell initiated legal proceedings on June 17, 2022, appealing under Revised Code (R.C.) 737.19(B), which allows police officers removed from their positions by village councils to challenge such decisions in common pleas court. He later amended his complaint to include claims for wrongful termination and defamation. However, on December 21, 2023, Yarnell voluntarily dismissed his appeal pursuant to Civil Rule 41(A)(1)(a).
On December 10, 2024, Yarnell refiled his case with similar claims. The Village of Smithville responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Civil Rule 12(C), arguing that the savings statute (R.C. 2305.19) did not permit refiling this type of administrative appeal. The trial court agreed and dismissed all claims, stating: “The defamation and wrongful termination claims fail as the administrative appeal cannot be combined with other claims.” Additionally, it found that defamation was barred by governmental immunity and determined that Yarnell could not pursue a violation of public policy claim because he was “not an at-will employee.” The case was dismissed in its entirety.
Yarnell appealed this decision to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, raising four assignments of error. He argued first that it was incorrect for the trial court to find that an R.C. 737.19(B) appeal is an administrative proceeding which cannot be voluntarily dismissed and then refiled using the savings statute.
The appellate court reviewed whether Civil Rule 41(A)(1)(a) applied to such appeals and concluded it did not: “Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) does not apply to Mr. Yarnell’s R.C. 737.19(B) appeal and Mr. Yarnell could not dismiss the appeal without prejudice.” The opinion explained that R.C. 737.19(B) appeals are special statutory proceedings governed by their own procedures rather than general civil rules or statutes unless explicitly referenced.
Furthermore, the appellate panel found that because these appeals must be filed within ten days of removal—a short window reflecting legislative intent for swift resolution—allowing voluntary dismissal followed by refiling up to a year later would undermine this purpose: “Allowing the appeal to be dismissed without prejudice then refiled pursuant to the savings statute up to a year later does not resolve the appeal quickly.” As such, “the trial court properly determined Mr. Yarnell’s appeal could not be refiled pursuant to R.C. 2305.19(A),” overruling his first assignment of error.
Yarnell also challenged the dismissal of his defamation and wrongful termination claims as improperly combined with his administrative appeal in one action rather than separate lawsuits as required by precedent: “Claims involving other matters other than those directly related to the administrative decision cannot be combined with an appeal from that decision.” The appellate majority affirmed this interpretation but noted through cited cases that if additional relief is sought beyond review of an administrative order—such as damages or injunctive relief—those must proceed separately.
His third assignment concerning immunity from defamation suits against political subdivisions was deemed moot based on prior rulings in this case.
Finally, regarding procedural handling under Civil Rule 12(C), the appellate court confirmed there was no error since jurisdictional defects require dismissal regardless of how they are raised: “Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Yarnell’s refiled appeal, the trial court did not err in dismissing the appeal.” All four assignments were overruled.
In a partial dissenting opinion, Judge Flagg Lanzinger agreed with most findings but disagreed with dismissing stand-alone claims for defamation and wrongful discharge solely because they were included alongside an untimely administrative appeal: “I disagree that including stand-alone claims in a complaint that also contains an administrative appeal serves as a basis to dismiss them… I would sustain Mr. Yarnell’s second assignment of error.” Nevertheless, Judge Sutton’s majority opinion prevailed.
Attorneys listed in this matter include Edgar H. Boles representing Daniel Yarnell and Ronya J. Rogers along with Kendra L. Barabasch representing Smithville; no judge names aside from those signing opinions are specified in relation to specific rulings within this document (Case ID: C.A No. 25AP0016).
Source: 2026Ohio1140_Yarnell_v_Village_of_Smithville_Opinion_Ohio_Court_of_Appeals.pdf
