A recent appellate court decision has clarified the authority of an election oversight body to set its own hearing procedures in disputes involving campaign finance filings. The ruling addresses whether state administrative rules governing such hearings conflict with broader statutory requirements, and directs a lower court to reconsider unresolved constitutional questions.
The case began when Hicks for a Better Clermont, a campaign committee formed by Christopher Hicks in December 2023, was notified by the Clermont County Board of Elections that its 2023 annual campaign finance report was overdue as of January 31, 2024. According to court documents, Mr. Hicks filed the required disclosure on February 29, 2024. The Board subsequently filed a complaint with the Ohio Election Integrity Commission on April 1, 2024, alleging that the filing was untimely.
In response to this complaint, Mr. Hicks submitted an affidavit stating he was unaware of the filing requirement and had not received any reminder from the commission. At an August 15, 2024 meeting attended by all commission members, the executive director presented the case and recommended a $50 fine for the late filing. Mr. Hicks testified before the commission that he did not receive advance notice about the requirement and questioned whether a report was necessary given his committee’s lack of financial activity that year.
After considering his arguments, the commission found a violation of Ohio Revised Code section 3517.13(D) but decided not to impose any penalty “for good cause shown.” This decision was formalized in an order dated October 4, 2024.
Mr. Hicks appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on October 17, 2024. In his appeal brief, he argued that the commission acted contrary to law by finding a violation without providing him with what he considered a proper hearing under section 3517.155 of state law. The commission countered that it had followed its established procedures as allowed by statute and administrative code.
On August 14, 2025, the common pleas court sided with Mr. Hicks and ruled that Administrative Code section 3517-1-11(e), which outlines preliminary review procedures for such complaints, conflicted with state statutes governing administrative hearings (specifically Chapter 119). The lower court found this rule internally inconsistent and remanded the matter back to the commission for another hearing that would provide more explicit procedural safeguards.
The Ohio Election Integrity Commission appealed this decision to the Tenth District Court of Appeals (case number 25AP-736). In its appeal, represented by attorneys from the office of Attorney General Dave Yost—Gregory A. Rustico and Michael A. Walton—the commission argued two main points: first, that it had statutory authority under former R.C. section 3517.157(D) to adopt procedures different from those in Chapter 119; second, that its rules were not internally inconsistent as claimed by the trial court.
The appellate court agreed with both arguments advanced by counsel for the commission. It noted that former R.C. section 3517.157(D) specifically permits deviations from general administrative procedure statutes when rules are adopted by this particular commission: “The commission or a panel of the commission shall conduct hearings in accordance with Chapter 119 … except as they are inconsistent with rules adopted by the commission.” The opinion explained that because this is a more specific statute than Chapter 119 generally applicable to agencies, it prevails where there is conflict.
Regarding internal consistency of Adm.Code section 3517-1-11(A), Judge Edelstein wrote that nothing in its plain language prevents it from serving both as an initial review mechanism and as grounds for final disposition if no significant factual dispute exists—a point overlooked by the trial court according to appellate judges BOGGS (presiding judge), DINGUS (judge), and EDELSTEIN (authoring judge).
However, while reversing on these issues, the appellate panel did not address whether these procedures satisfy constitutional due process guarantees under federal or state constitutions because “the trial court did not reach” those arguments raised by Mr. Hicks regarding procedural fairness.
As directed by Tuesday’s decision rendered March 31, 2026: “we reverse … and we remand … for further proceedings consistent with this decision.” On remand at Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (case number C.P.C No.24CV-7973), judges will first consider whether Adm.Code section 3517-1-11(A) meets constitutional standards before addressing other arguments raised by Mr. Hicks.
Christopher Hicks represented himself during oral argument before both courts; Gregory A. Rustico argued on behalf of Attorney General Dave Yost’s office for the Ohio Election Integrity Commission.
